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Logic of the Weak State

Divided societies, divided states?
Literature review: the Divided State in theory & in practice

In the process of designing or reconstructing governance structures, institutions, or legal frameworks, men are effectively establishing the formal rules that will regulate the societies in which they live. To be sure, exactly who writes the rules – and the strategies they adopt to legitimize and enforce them – generally determines which the political culture that arises, and power structures that these rules serve to change, create and/or support. Nonetheless, the overarching goal is to bring some form of predictability and consistency to human interactions, and this through improved control over the power struggles and competition that inevitably arise in social life.

Some observe that this goal (a modicum of political stability and social control) might be more elusive for some countries than for others. Whether ‘modernizing’, post-colonial or post-conflict, many of the countries evoked throughout the readings suffer from protracted or recurring political instability and conflict. These countries are often labeled as ‘divided societies’, primarily due to the fact that their chronic instability stems from struggles between social groups who compete on the basis of ‘traditional’ or ‘primordial’ identities. The comparison is often made with ‘Western’ or ‘modern’ systems where “most citizens associate themselves with the identity of the state itself, rather than with any ethnic, linguistic, or religious group.”¹ However, in spite of the social and political power that ‘primordial identities’ might in fact wield in these societies, it can be highly problematic to view identity-based political conflict as a reflection of ‘insurmountable’ divisions caused by natural, or permanent, social cleavages. Rather, these identity-based political conflicts need to be understood as the (in no way unique) manifestations of power struggles as countries search for new political formulas and strategies to manage complex socio-political systems destabilized by disruptive forces of change (whether endogenous or exogenous).

¹ Mansfield, 2003: 2091

I. Primordial groups & social structures in divided societies

While it may not be the root cause of conflict, identity nonetheless remains a crucial element due to its proven potency as a tool for political mobilization and opposition as these countries try to achieve a desired equilibrium. Therefore a few assertions can, *and must*, be made, in order to try to understand how political transition might occur without sparking a violent backlash:

- **All identities are socially constructed,**² and most people are at all times balancing between multiple identities.³
- **History has also shown that some are far more powerful and durable than others.**⁴ The power and durability of identities generally relies on two factors:
 - a. The symbolic power and depth of the identity's constituent elements.

This relative symbolic power and depth results from the fact that “some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural – some would say spiritual – affinity than from social interaction.”⁵ Geertz calls these ‘primordial identities’ and says “these congruities of blood, speech, and custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves.”⁶
 - b. The nature, power and durability of the social institutions and tools that ensure the production, dissemination, and enforcement of the identity.
 - i. Some identities are developed through life-long customs and rituals that can be much more psychologically rooted than, say, professional or ideological affiliation.
 - ii. Some identities are ascriptive rather than elective – race, sect, ethnicity reflect either a physical trait or an entrenched social reality; both are easily

² To the extent that they correspond to “the symbolic assignment of meaning to an otherwise mute abundance of facticities.” Dabashi, Hamid (1993)

³ Here we can illustrate this interrelationship using the concept of ‘dialogism’ as employed by Linda Layne (1994) in her study of the social identification in Jordan: “Different collective identities can be intricately related. The relationship between them might be called ‘dialogic,’ to use a Bakhtinian term (...) [which] refers to the constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others. Which will affect the other, how it will do so and in what degree is what is actually settled at the moment of utterance.”

⁴ In his study of the ethnic conflict that erupted between Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority (a mere 11% of the population) in recent decades, Horowitz (1989) notes that “the Ceylon Tamils arrived in Sri Lanka on average perhaps a thousand years ago” (19), a testimony to the durability of primordial identities even as minorities - even though the recent salience of this identity group also reflects the important role that external actors can play (here British colonialism that favored the Tamils in the country’s civil service).

⁵ Geertz, 1963: 3

⁶ Ibid. An interesting example of how this difference can concretely impact social relations can be taken from pre-1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the growing tension between three ethnoreligious groups, the Orthodox Serbs, the Catholic Croats, and the Muslims: “Nation-state aspiring, ethnically focused Serbs and Croats focused on shared blood and a myth of common origins. (...) Muslims de-emphasized descent (‘ethnicity’) and focused instead on a shared environment, cultural practices, a shared sentiment, common experiences.” As a result, “Some argued that while Serb, Croat and Slovene nationhood was *natural* because it was based on unambiguous and common ethnic origin, the national identity of the Muslims was merely based on ‘psychological identification’ subject to self-observation, and therefore by implication, less natural” Bringa, 1995: 30-31

enforceable and people therefore often cannot escape them **when** they become politicized.

- iii. Some identities are supported by social institutions that have more ‘infrastructural power’ – they are better established, are more pervasive, and can mobilize more resources (think mosques in many Arab countries). These institutions can therefore create and sustain social and cultural realities. Through social conditioning they can determine the hierarchy of competing identities (individual over clan?). Similarly they can shape political culture by shaping what people consider ‘legitimate political authority’, and therefore determine which identity serves as the vehicle for political dissent.⁷

- **The level of compatibility between identity groups can vary according to the particular dynamics or incentives of any given context.** While in a context of volatility and fear primordial identities might serve as a tool for conflict, in a context of security and stability these same identities can be a source of social capital, cooperation and creativity. For instance, religion “has what scholars have called a ‘Janus face,’ serving as ‘the carrier of not only exclusive, particularistic, and primordial identities but also of inclusive, universalistic, and transcending ones.’ Religion’s public role is consequently ambivalent and ‘constructs not only bellicose communal identities but also democratic civil society.’”⁸

Most countries placed into the category of ‘divided societies’ are characterized by the continued political power, within their territorial boundaries, of multiple social structures predicated on primordial identities. (**Annex 1**) The fate of the elites who control these social structures is therefore closely tied to their capacity to perpetuate a certain ‘primordial identity-centric’ social dynamic and political culture. Their capacity to do so is, in turn, determined by the ‘infrastructural power’ of the social institutions that mediate their control of and influence over a segment of society. These social structures can also be harnessed by self-interested political entrepreneurs. In 1950’s Sri Lanka, in the midst of ‘modernization’ led in part by an “Oxford-educated, vaguely Marxist, and essentially secularist (...) S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (...) the institution of universal suffrage made the temptation to court the masses by appealing to traditional loyalties virtually irresistible, and led Bandaranaike and his followers to gamble, unsuccessfully as it turned out, on being able to tune primordial sentiments up before elections and down after them.”⁹ Tragically for the country’s people, Bandaranaike “soon found himself the helpless victim of a rising tide of primordial fervor.”¹⁰

Moreover, as a result of the construction of this socio-political reality, the broader social bases of primordial identity groups can also be very resistant to change. The material well-being, security and

⁷ One particularly vivid illustration of this durability and political influence can be found in the Zaydi-Shi’i revival in Northern Yemen, where local communities resisting the creeping domination of central state power can draw on the powerful symbolism associated with a long historical tradition of Zaydi political activism and opposition, supported by theological principles that “define the legitimacy of rulers in terms of their descent from Imam ‘Ali via his sons al-Hasan and al-Husayn” (186) and in terms of their commitment to engaging in revolutionary activity continue to be disseminated through influential Zaydi schools of law (*madhhab*, pl. *madhahib*) which the central state has sought (but failed) to undermine. See Vom Bruck (2010)

⁸ Corstange, 2012: 118

⁹ Geertz, 1963: 8-9

¹⁰ Ibid.

sometimes survival of individuals becomes (whether they like it or not) directly linked to that of the primordial group into which they were born or placed involuntarily. This resistance is especially true in conflict and post-conflict settings, where identity can be tied to fears of survival. For instance: “in ethnic wars both hyper-nationalistic mobilization rhetoric and real atrocities harden ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals are unlikely to be made and even less likely to be heard.”¹¹

II. The political management of divided societies: process design and institutional design

The challenge of state-building for divided societies therefore consists in having to build a stable and functioning political system despite an initial lack of cohesion and integration between different social groups and their elites. Moreover, these social structures are often highly resistant to change, and have at their disposal significant symbolic and infrastructural power that the nascent central state institutions dearly lack. This is, obviously, the same problem almost all modern states have faced at one point or another in the centralization and consolidation of political power. In the nation-states of Western Europe, this process famously lasted several centuries and involved tremendous conflict.

Can measures be taken today for the process to occur peacefully?

In our case, the readings address broadly two different types of more contemporary scenarios.

- First would be a ‘modernizing’, perhaps newly-independent, post-colonial state, where newly created central state institutions try to extend and consolidate their power. This scenario applies to both Lebanon in the decades between 1947 and 1975, as well as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Tito between World War II and 1991 (both periods ending with an outbreak of civil war). It also applies to the experiences of Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, India, Morocco and Nigeria, as described by Geertz (1963) and Sri Lanka and Malaysia as described by Horowitz (1989).¹²
- Second, we have internationally-brokered post-conflict reconstruction scenarios. These generally consist of efforts to reconstruct central state institutions and re-establish a unified political system in countries where any pre-existing “social cohesion and political legitimacy have been destroyed by civil conflict, and the ethnic fissures that precipitated war can rupture with alarming ease and speed.”¹³ This scenario applies to Lebanon after the Taif Agreement of 1989, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) after the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995.

While there are certainly significant similarities between these two model scenarios, they remain fundamentally different in terms of actors involved, strategies adopted (both rhetorically and de facto), and the resulting time horizons. Given the huge variation from one case to another, we have to draw this distinction in a stylized way, for the sake of argument:

¹¹ Kaufman, 1996: 137

¹² “Recent developments in Sri Lankan and Malaysian ethnic conflict raise important issues about the development of conflict and conflict-reducing mechanisms.” Horowitz, Donald. *Incentives and behavior in ethnic politics of Sri Lanka and Malaysia*. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 4, Ethnicity in World Politics (Oct., 1989) pp.18-35

¹³ Mansfield, 2003: 2053

- In the first scenario, the process of ‘modernization’ or post-independence political transition is overwhelmingly internally driven. Of course in general foreign actors have had and may retain significant influence, either through direct intervention or through the continuity of culture, ideology, and institutions and power structures from a prior period. Nonetheless, the process is led by domestic political leaders and reflects their strategies of power consolidation in the face of significant socio-political fragmentation. The organic interaction between complex social realities and the different strategies adopted by the agents of central power consolidation results in a dizzying array of different structural and institutional configurations. For example:
 - In post-WW II Yugoslavia, after horrendous violence “Tito’s dream was to create a new Yugoslavia where the different groups who had fought each other could live together in peace and prosperity.”¹⁴ Therefore he created the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a federation of six republics founded around deeply entrenched primordial identities. “In the Yugoslav multi-ethnic and socialist federal state, ‘nationality policies’ were the tool by which the federated state sought to secure peace and a balance of power between its constituent parts to legitimate its structure and thus its existence.”¹⁵

Further examples are provided by Geertz’s brief presentation of countries:

- “Center-and-arc regionalism and dual leadership in Indonesia, single-party interracial alliance in Malaya, aggressive assimilationism wrapped in constitutional legalism in Burma, a cosmopolitan central party with provincial machines fighting a multifront war against every sort of parochialism known to man (and a few known only to Hindus) in India, sectarian state-making and log-rolling in Lebanon, Janus-faced autocratic rule in Morocco, and unfocused checks-and-balance scrimmaging in Nigeria (...)”¹⁶

Crucially, the domestic leaders, while all focused on centralized power consolidation, are not necessarily committed to ‘building a stable and inclusive central state for a pluralistic society’ – some may seek to establish the domination of one group (as the Burmese in Burma), while others may seek the accommodation of groups via a multi-group coalition (as with the Alliance Party in Malaya), and even others might seek to create a secular central state and political system – and this last strategy can be pursued either rapidly through the attempted suppression and eradication of primordial identities and their supporting social structures (one thinks here of the radical and violent attempts to impose socialist-Communist reforms in Afghanistan between the overthrow of King Mohammed Zahir Shah 1973 and the Soviet invasion of 1979¹⁷), or alternatively through a more patient and incremental process seeking the extension in the periphery of central power via the gradual dislocation of competing local power brokers. In Syria, long-time authoritarian ruler Hafez al-Assad’s core regime relied on a cunning combination of both to maintain its control over a deeply fragmented society: the ruling elite relied heavily on cultivating primordial identities to both strengthen the ‘*esprit de corps*’ (‘*asabiyya*’) of a core of supporters (playing on family ties within their ‘Allawi clan) and build a

¹⁴ Bringa, 1995: 23

¹⁵ Bringa, 1995: 25

¹⁶ Geertz, 1963: 26

¹⁷ On the socialist-Communist reforms in Afghanistan, see Barfield, 1984: 179 for the early People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan reforms between 1973-1978 and Roy, 1990: 88-89 for the 1978-1978 reforms.

coalition of ruling minority identity groups, while at the same time actively using the nationalist Baath party's ideology of secular modernization to actively undermine and weaken competing identity groups.¹⁸ Importantly, many of these strategies are hardly fixed and rigid, but rather much more based on trial-and-error, experimentation, and often ad-hoc solutions to fluid and unpredictable socio-political processes.

- Within the context of internationally-led post-conflict reconstruction projects, the overarching normative goal is generally much more clearly defined – given that the interventions or projects are usually undertaken (or at least justified) on humanitarian grounds, the end goal cannot be anything else than a stable and inclusive central state for a pluralistic society, whereby some form of solution is found in order to maintain both national unity and the integrity and security of all sub-national groups.¹⁹ The tricky part is that these groups need to not only coexist, but also cooperate in order to achieve a functional and performing state. Overall, this can be recognized as a laudable objective – but, somewhat paradoxically, too much focus on the end goal may come at the expense of much needed attention on the process, and therefore have dramatic consequences on the outcome. It may very well be true that, given any socio-political context, no matter how complex, the perfectly-designed framework of governance structures and institutions will create just the right incentives to avoid conflict and encourage cooperation between groups as they build a shared political system and culture. But not only is the likelihood of designing such a ‘perfect framework’ quite low, but also and more importantly, a new social equilibrium simply cannot be achieved quickly, by merely imposing a well-designed set of political structures. These structures will be completely worthless if they aren't accepted as legitimate by the local population, and if elites don't have the sense of ownership and the necessary underlying time-proven relationships of trust and compromise without which many institutions and political mechanisms simply cannot function. There is no way to avoid a long, messy and unpredictable process of social change necessary to lay the foundations for a new, stable and sustainable political system. Concluding a rather harsh assessment of the international community's work in Bosnia and Herzegovina, MacMahan and Western write: “It is impossible to create a functional state that can be sustained and governed by local actors merely by throwing money and resources at the problem. As the experience in Bosnia has proved, **state building is not a problem to be solved but a process to be managed.**”²⁰

III. What can be done?

If we do accept the end goal stated above (building a stable and inclusive central state for a pluralistic society), one of the core challenges is to negotiate a process of power transfer, away from subnational centers of power and elites, and towards the formal institutions of a central state. There can, of course, be many different types of subnational centers of power and elites; here we refer to those that might rely on primordial, exclusive identity politics to contest the political legitimacy of the central state. In order to

¹⁸ Seurat, 1988: 31

¹⁹ This is generally accepted as the normative goal of most contemporary approaches to institutional design for post-conflict state-building, including Arend Lijphart's ‘Consociational model’ and Donald Horowitz's ‘Integrative model’. Cf. Caspersen, 2004: 570

²⁰ MacMahan and Western, 2009: 82

avoid a violent backlash, these potential competitors need to be recognized, understood and included in the process of social and political transformation. However, they also gradually need to be disconnected from the political sphere while substituting a political culture that promotes, incentivizes and engenders political action through civil channels.

In order for this social and political transition to occur peacefully, it needs to be undertaken on the basis of a long-term strategy with a multi-step process. In general terms, the objective is to build an overarching political order based on governance structures and institutional arrangements with the flexibility needed to adjust to shifting realities and needs over time. Moreover, the process must be actively supported by a credible and depoliticized international body that retains some leverage over domestic actors so as to be able to concretely and effectively influence internal processes when/if necessary.

Phase 1. Social stabilization and de-escalation of conflict

The first objective is to create structures that stabilize inter-group relations and maintain social security. The structures and institutions need to confer the necessary separation and autonomy to competing groups, while avoiding secessionist attempts by maintaining each group connected to central structures via power-sharing agreements and conflict management mechanisms. The inclination to moderation and compromise within identity-based groups and elites is highest when they feel secure and somewhat empowered. While this claim in itself may raise few objections, it nonetheless leaves room for significant debate about just *how much* security, guarantees ('collective rights') and space ('autonomy') groups should be given. Chaim Kaufmann (1996) makes a forceful case for the necessity to complete autonomy (imposed physical separation) between ethnic groups in post-conflict situations. The importance of having some form of separation more generally is supported by the analysis conducted by Nina Caspersen on the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in post-conflict Bosnia: "Pluralism might be best afforded when the power base is secure (...) in situations of deep divisions following a very intense ethnic war, heterogeneous municipalities seem to foster extremism rather than moderation."²¹

Phase 2. Integration

However, evidence also suggests that excessive homogeneity in political units, if combined with governance structures that confer too much power to the dominant group with no incentives for moderation, cross-group appeals or multi-group coalitions (as might be generated by an adequate electoral system), will tend to prevent inter-group collaboration, and exacerbate social divisions by rewarding elites who instrumentalize or exploit identity politics.²² Therefore, the types of structures and institutions that may work during Phase 1 need to be changed over time. There is a high chance that the

²¹ Caspersen, 2004: 577-579

²² Horowitz (1989: 24-26) offers a good example of how this process played out in Sri Lanka between the 1950's and 70's, as well as how the combination of different demographic distributions and different governance structures (electoral systems) in Malaysia contributed to the reverse effect, creating integrative/centripetal forces in Malaysian society rather than deepening divisions as happened in Sri Lanka. Similarly, Mansfield (2003) cites in note 24, page 2058, "Institutions (...) which are composed of members representing only their ethnic group... force their members to behave much more like lobby representatives than statesmen seeking a common interest which does not violate vital interests of their community."

measures taken during Phase 1 will have empowered political actors who will then offer significant resistance to changes that would undermine the most-likely identity-driven political strategies on which they relied and would therefore challenge their accumulated power.

This is a very delicate phase in the process of social and political reconstruction. A quick look at the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement can offer some very important insights. The Peace Agreement was intended to stop violence between competing ethnic groups after civil conflict. To this end, it created a complex set of governance structures and institutions to accommodate these groups, each with a high degree of autonomy yet connected to an overarching political system. The solution, simply put, resembled a multi-tiered model that combined joint-institutions with guaranteed representation ratios (power-sharing & grand alliance) and self-governing entities (autonomy) – “owing to the veto provisions at the central level and the great degree of decentralization, power tends to gravitate to more majoritarian, homogenous institutions in the two entities [the predominantly Serb Republika Srpska (RS) and the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH)], and ethnic autonomy is, to a large extent, the defining feature of the structure.”²³ (see Annex 2)

Therefore, the initial solution promoted more autonomy and self-governance for ethnic groups. However, the international community retained important levers within the system through which it could influence the political reconstruction process. Beyond the obvious Office of the High Representative (OHR), “the international supervisory body responsible for civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement”²⁴ which itself was overseen by a Peace Implementation Council of 55 countries,²⁵ another key leverage point at the disposal of the international community came from the three (of nine) seats on the Constitutional Court reserved for international non-Bosnian appointees “selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights after consultation with the Presidency.”²⁶ Through the combination of its presence on the Constitutional Court and the OHR, the international community was able to play a direct role in a protracted, four year process which finally led a significant shift in the functioning and direction of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-1995 institutions.

In 2000, the Constitutional Court passed the last of four parts of its Constituent Peoples Decision, after two years of deliberation. This landmark judicial ruling used diplomatic and nuanced language to challenge some of the outcomes of the Dayton Peace Agreement, in part by denouncing as unconstitutional “the existence of two ethnically segregated and independent Entities and their inherently discriminatory constitutional orders.”²⁷ The government – controlled mostly by an array of ethnic nationalist political parties whose power was at stake – resisted this ruling and took another two years to agree on how to react, undergoing a long-process multi-group negotiations with heavy involvement by the third-party OHR.²⁸ In March 2002 all of the main political parties in Bosnia Herzegovina passed the Sarajevo Implementation Agreement which introduced a number of marginal yet nonetheless important reforms. In the end, the outcomes were modest: “despite the slight wealening of the consociational guarantees and the introduction of some integrative elements in the formation of government, the changes

²³ Caspersen, 2004: 573

²⁴ Mansfield, 2003: 2055

²⁵ MacMahon and Western, 2009: 76

²⁶ Mansfield, 2003: 2060

²⁷ Mansfield, 2003: 2067

²⁸ Caspersen, 2004: 574

maintain a structure based on ethnicity.”²⁹ And yet, Mansfield in 2004 did not see some signs of progress, including some improvements in performance of governmental and legislative institutions, increasing rates of return of displaced persons leading to rising demographic heterogeneity, and most importantly – the adoption of a State Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education designed to replace a “highly segregated and ethnically biased educational system”³⁰.

IV. Conclusion

In an ideal scenario, the type of changes described above would lead Bosnia and Herzegovina to a gradual move away from a fragmented, largely dysfunctional political system and a divisive political culture based on ethnic identities. Over time, one might hope that increasingly efficient and functional institutions would accrue support and legitimacy by generating form of social and political utility. This utility would create incentives for both elites and the masses to gradually transfer their political allegiance from ‘traditional’ political leaders (as members of a primordial group) to the state (as citizens).³¹ At the same time, the increased institutional capacity and reach of the state would provide it with increasing penetration of society and replace social institutions as the definer of what constitutes legitimate political authority: “A political ideology for the pluralistic state should be worked out as a platform of the government, and the educational system should be refurbished to inculcate national ideas as symbols transcending all the political symbols of the subgroups.”³² (see [Annex 3](#))

Unfortunately, any enthusiasm one might begin to sense at the thought of such a gradual and relatively peaceful transition is rapidly suppressed by MacMahon and Western’s much more bleak assessment of the situation in post-Dayton Bosnia as of 2009. The authors describe a situation in which the performance of state institutions continues to be severely undermined by political gridlock, corruption and clientelism³³, politics are still dominated by ethnic chauvinists³⁴, and the overall system is actively destabilized by increasingly uncoordinated and politicized international interventions. “After 14 years of intense international efforts to stabilize and rebuild Bosnia, the country now stands on the brink of collapse.”³⁵

The theories of social and political change that have shaped the present models and analysis suggest that an initially deeply divided society does not in any way preclude the establishment of a stable and inclusive political system. However, we have also seen that the transition requires a very significant shift in power structures, as the elites that have relied on identity-based social structures to sustain a well-established political order need to be gradually disconnected from the political sphere in favor of civil state institutions that should serve all citizens indiscriminately (in an ideal world, or as long as the state hasn’t been captured by a new elite or coalition of elites.) Achieving this transition requires a very well designed and evolving set of governance structures and institutions intended to incentivize elite

²⁹ Caspersen, 2004: 583

³⁰ Mansfield, 2003: 2090

³¹ In his broad analysis of processes of territorial centralization and state consolidation, Michael Mann (1988) comes to a similar conclusion, namely that “autonomous state power is the product of the usefulness of enhanced territorial centralization to social life in general.”

³² Salem, 1979: 461

³³ MacMahon and Western, 2009: 73

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ MacMahon and Western, 2009: 69

cooperation and social integration – but it also requires guidance and targeted, de-politicized interventions by external actors, and, most of all, a lot of time, patience, perseverance, and willingness to accept imperfect equilibriums as necessary steps in a long, long process.

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
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Annex 1.



Annex 2


Consociational State: Political Structures reflect social structures: power sharing & guaranteed representation

Nascent state institutions must directly produce and transmit the symbols, ideas and narratives of new, overarching and inclusive identity. Ethno-nationalist elites resist this move that undermines their source of political power.

"A political ideology for the pluralistic state should be worked out as a platform of the government, and the educational system should be refurbished to inculcate national ideas as symbols transcending all the political symbols of the subgroups."
Salem, 1979: 461

One example of a positive step in this direction is the **State Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education** passed by the Bosnian central state and designed to replace a "highly segregated and ethnically biased educational system."
Mansfield, 2003: 2090

Divided Society



"owing to the veto provisions at the central level and the great degree of decentralization, power tends to gravitate to more majoritarian, homogenous institutions in the two entities and ethnic autonomy is, to a large extent, the defining feature of the structure."
Caspersen, 2004: 573

Annex 3

